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Why the Doctor-Patient Relationship is
Disintegrating at the Hands of Health
Maintenance Organizations and
Wall Street
Mark 0. Hiepler*
Brian C. Dunn**
Less than a year before his death from pancreatic cancer, Cardinal
Joseph Bernardin, the Archbishop of Chicago, addressed the American
Medical Association (AMA) House of Delegates at the AMA's Annual
Meeting in December 1995.' His topic? Given his condition, one may
have expected the Cardinal to touch on a practical aspect of medicine,
perhaps a call for more research and development funding. No, a man
who undoubtedly had access to the best medical care available was
concerned for the care that the rest of the country was to receive in the
future. Instead, Cardinal Bernardin touched on what he termed the
"moral crisis" facing medicine today, particularly with respect to doc-
tors.2
Cardinal Bernardin articulated what all of us know, but few will talk
about: the doctor-patient relationship is, at its heart, a moral covenant
between physician and patient.' More importantly, however, he iden-
tified what most have only begun to recognize: the onset of managed
* Partner, Hiepler & Hiepler, Oxnard, CA, B.A., 1984, Pt. Loma Nazarene College;
J.D., 1988, Pepperdine University.
** J.D. Candidate, 1998, Pepperdine University; Law Clerk, Hiepler & Hiepler,
Oxnard, CA, B.A, 1995 Pepperdine University.
1. See Reflections on 'Moral Crisis' Gripping Medical Profession, AM. MED. NEWS,
Feb. 5, 1996, at 31 [hereinafter Reflections]. In actuality this is an excerpted tran-
script of the Cardinal's remarks before the assembled AMA House of Delegates. See
id.
2. See id.
3. See id.
care in America has steadily and increasingly attacked the moral center
of the doctor-patient relationship, in effect precipitating a "divorce"
between doctor and patient.4 By interfering with and constraining this
relationship between patients and doctors, health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs)5 have made the two no longer accountable to each other,
all the while standing back and claiming that they have nothing to do
with medical decisions. If managed care chooses to impose the many
restrictions and constraints on the relationship between doctor and
patient that it currently does, then any and all overseers and administra-
tors causing the interference should be held to the same standard as
doctors. Cardinal Bernardin was completely correct in his call for a
return to the application of a high moral and ethical standard for doc-
tors, but that standard needs to be required of all participants in the
health care delivery system.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the evolution of the various as-
pects of the doctor-patient relationship.6 Part II examines the Various
pressures that are being exerted against it by the managed care indus-
try.7 Part III provides the key to the reconciliation and restoration of
the relationship.' Finally, in Part TV a brief conclusion is offered 9
I. FROM HIPPOCRATES TO BERNARDIN: THE EVOLUTION AND IDEAL OF THE
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
The doctor-patient relationship of the modern era is inextricably
intertwined with the Hippocratic Oath. The importance of the Hippo-
cratic Oath, believed to have been written by the celebrated Greek
physician, Hippocrates, around 400 B.C., lies in its elevation of medi-
cine as an esteemed profession and its creation of an ideal to which all
physicians, past and present, should strive. More than two thousand
years ago, Hippocrates recognized that doctors hold a special place in
any society, one that comes with certain responsibilities. The idea of
4. See id.
5. Throughout this Article, HMOs will be used as representatives for all managed
care organizations (MCOs). In our experience, we have found that this nomenclature
is not merely for convenience, but because HMOs are the largest and most populated
of the MCOs, and are also the entities that draw the most complaints from consum-
ers.
6. See infra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 30-58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
10. See A.D. 1995 Restatement of the Oath of Hippocrates (Circa 400 B.C.) (visit-
ed Nov. 4,1997)<http://ccmemac4.bsd.uchicago.edu/CCMEPolicies/MedCodes/Hippo#hippo
law>.
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"do no harm"" is one of the most oft-quoted statements in history.
Through the years, the Hippocratic Oath has been adapted and re-
written to conform to the customs and mores of each age, but its pre-
cepts have remained virtually unchanged.
The modem doctor-patient relationship, however, consists of much
more than the idea that physicians are to do no harm. In California, the
relationship between doctor and patient has been held sacred and has
been protected since at least 1872.12 Like the priest-penitent' 3 and at-
torney-client relationships, 4 the relationship between doctor and pa-
tient carries with it a special privilege. 5 This privilege is in place to en-
courage informed exchanges between doctor and patient with the
hopes of healing.
Today, however, the doctor-patient relationship is largely defined by
legal principles. Our nation's courts have determined the following: (1)
a doctor owes a fiduciary duty to the patient, 6 a duty to place the in-
terests and well-being of the patient above the interests of the doctor or
a third party, 17 and (2) the doctor owes a duty to the patient to main-
11. See id. The original text of the Hippocratic Oath reads, in relevant part, "I will
follow that system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgement [sic], I
consider for the benefit of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and
mischievous." Id.
12. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 994 (Deering 1997 & Supp. 1998) (codifying the privi-
leged relationship between physicians and their patients).
13. See id. §§ 1033-1034 (codifying the privileged relationship between clergy-per-
sons and their parishioners).
14. See id. § 954 (codifying the privileged relationship between attorneys and their
clients).
15. See id. § 994.
16. For a more comprehensive discussion of the fiduciary duty and its evolution in
the managed care setting, see Thomas H. Boyd, Cost Containment and the
Physician's Fiduciary Duty to the Patient, 39 DEPAuL L. REV. 131 (1989); Marc A.
Rodwin, Strains in the Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obliga-
tions in a Changing Health Care System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241 (1995).
17. The North Carolina Supreme Court gave a more complete description of the
fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship in Black v. Littlejohn, 325 S.E.2d
469, 482 (N.C. 1985). The court stated the following: "The relationship of patient and
physician is generally considered a fiduciary one, imposing upon the physician the
duty of good faith and fair dealing." Id. (citing 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians Surgeons,
and Other Health Healers § 166 (1981)). "This special relationship envisions an ex-
pectation by both parties that the patient will rely upon the judgment and expertise
of the doctor." Id. (citing Witherell v. Weimer, 421 N.E.2d 869 (11. 1981)). "Further-
more, this relation is predicated on the fundamental proposition that the physician
tain the standard of care to which doctors are held, the breach of
which would give rise to malpractice liability. Various governing bodies
have compiled codes of ethics that impose minimum standards by
which doctors are to conduct the practice of medicine; if they fail to
adhere to such standards, doctors rim the risk of losing their license to
practice medicine.18 Lost among this increased emphasis on legal and
ethical standards is the very moral aspect of the doctor-patient relation-
ship.
As Cardinal Bernardin described it, the doctor-patient relationship is
first and foremost a moral one for four reasons: (1) the patient's reli-
ance on the doctor's competence, morality, and compassion; (2) the
holistic, caretaker-like character of the medical decisions made by doc-
tors; (3) society's investment of faith in medicine; and (4) the personal
commitment and advocacy that patients expect from their doctors."1
One might expect a moral discussion from a person like Cardinal
Bernardin, but other doctors, scholars, and health care observers have
recognized the moral nature of the relationship as well.2" In an article
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association, a doc-
tor and a lawyer pooled their collective talent and knowledge in an
attempt to describe the ideal doctor-patient relationship.2" Their con-
clusion bears a remarkable resemblance to that reached by Cardinal
Bernardin. They described the ideal doctor-patient relationship in terms
possesses 'special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and treating diseases and inju-
ries, which the patient lacks, and that the patient has sought and obtained the servic-
es of the physician because of such special knowledge and skill.'" Id. (quoting 61 AM.
JUR. 2D Physicians Surgeons, and Other Health Healers § 167 (1981)).
18. An example is the International Code of Medical Ethics, which was adopted in
1949. See 1 WORLD MED. ASS'N BULL. at 11]. (1949). The governing code of physicians
in the Unites States is the AMA Code of Medical Ethics. See AMA CODE OF MED.
ETHICS, reprinted in CODES OF RESPONSIBiTY 263 (Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994).
19. See Reflections, supra note 1, at 32.
20. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
21. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-
Patient Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995).
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of six Cs:' choice," competence,' communication,2 5 compassion,2 6
continuity,2 7 and no conflict of interest.'
This ideal is slowly disappearing due to the ever-changing face of
medicine. The advent of HMOs in the last two decades, with their in-
creased emphasis on cost-cutting and rationing of medical care, has
forced a change in the way we look at medicine, specifically the doctor-
patient relationship. Can it survive as a commodity traded on the stock
market? The early returns are not promising as more and more doctors
flee the states where HMOs are most prominent. 29
22. See id. at 324-25; see also Gail Povar & Jonathan Moreno, Hippocrates and the
Health Maintenance Organization, A Discussion of Ethical Issues, 109 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 419 (1988). In their discussion, Povar and Moreno broke their analysis of
the doctor-patient relationship into three duties. See id. at 420-22.
23. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 21, at 324. Among the choices discussed
are those relating to the "practice type and setting," the "primary care physician,"
"specialist or special facility," and "treatment alternatives." Id. Emanuel and Dubler
speak of choice as an essential "component of self-determination, a central ideal of
American culture." Id.
24. See id. Emanuel and Dubler stressed that physicians must have competence in
current" knowledge, "technical skills," "clinical judgment," and in the "understanding
of their own limitations and a willingness to consult specialists .... " Id.
25. See id. at 324-25. Communication entails the ability to "listen to and under-
stand the patient" as well as to communicate to the patient that the doctor is listen-
ing and understanding, and the ability to explain to patients "the nature of their dis-
ease" and the treatment options in clear language, including giving advice and coun-
seling. See id.
26. See id. Compassion includes both empathy and assisting patients in changing
their perspectives on the situation. See id.
27. See id. The ideal doctor-patient relationship involves a long-term commitment
that allows the doctor and patient to feel comfortable with each other and develop a
rapport that can greatly assist the treatment and healing process. See id.
28. See id. The patient expects that the doctor will act as a fiduciary, that the
patient's interests will "take precedence over the physician's own personal interests,
especially financial interests," or "the interests of a third party." See id. at 325. In
other words, patients need to be able to trust their doctors. For a deeper discussion
of the role of trust in the doctor-patient relationship, see David Mechanic & Mark
Schlesinger, The Impact of Managed Care on Patients' Trust in Medical Care and
Their Physicians, 275 JAMA 1693 (1996); see also David Mechanic, Managed Care as
a Target of Distrust, 277 JAMA 1810 (1997) (criticizing the economic motivations of
managed care groups).
29. See Cara S. Trager, Doctors Become Candidates for Transplants: Economic
Demands Forcing Many to Relocate or Switch Their Careers, CRAIN's N.Y. Bus., Nov.
8, 1996, at 28, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busdtl File (discussing the recent
trend, although consisting primarily of anecdotal evidence, of doctors leaving states,
Hl. PATIENTS VERSUS PROFITS: THE ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTATION ON
HUMANS" BY HMOs THAT IS CAUSING THE BREAK-UP OF
THE DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
Managed care is a generic term used to describe the various health
care delivery systems created in response to the traditional fee for ser-
vice (FFS) indemnity insurance system. The two most common man-
aged care organizations" are HMOs32 and preferred provider organiza-
tions (PPOs).' In exchange for a monthly premium, and possibly some
sort of small copayment at the point of service, HMOs purport to pro-
vide a variety of health care services to their members,' but often re-
strict the provider, the amount, or the type of service, as well as the
such as California, where HMOs are highly saturated); The HMO Wars: The Patch-
work System of Regulating Health Maintenance Organizations Is Getting New Scru-
tiny Amid the Ever-Growing Drumbeat of Complaints About HMOs, CAL. J., Aug. 1,
1997, at 12, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cajrml File (same).
30. See infra note 39. This phrase came up somewhere in the many conversations
with Dr. Dennis Robbins, whose book is mentioned in note 39. Though we cannot re-
member who originated the phrase, Dr. Robbins at least deserves the bulk of the
credit for its elaboration in his books and numerous speeches.
31. Although HMOs and PPOs are by far the most common, new hybrids and vari-
ations are being created all the time. The newest entries into the market are the Pro-
vider-Sponsored Organizations (PSOs), which attempt to do away with the HMO/PPO
infrastructure by having individual doctors and/or medical groups take over the ad-
ministrative functions. While it is too soon to really analyze the point of service
(POS) effect on managed care, it is unlikely that PSOs will improve the doctor-pa-
tient relationship in any significant way. In fact, with doctors having increased admin-
istrative roles, they will have less time per patient than ever before.
32. HMOs purport to provide basic health care services to their members in ex-
change for the prepayment of a monthly premium. There are two basic HMO models.
Staff or Group Model HMOs contract directly with physician medical groups and may
employ the physicians directly at HMO hospitals. Network Model HMOs or Individual
Practice Association (IPA) Model HMOs contract with a network of physicians or
medical groups, which then use existing hospitals and facilities. In the IPA model, the
IPA makes the decisions about the care received by subscribers. A common charac-
teristic of all HMOs is that subscribers may receive payment for health care services
only if they are rendered by the HMO's doctors.
In our experience, IPA model HMOs engender the most complaints because that
model places the greatest financial incentives on doctors to limit care.
33. PPOs consist of panels of physician; or hospitals that provide health care ser-
vices to members. Members pay monthly premiums to the PPO, which then pays a
discounted rate to the physician or hospital used by the member. Members may also
be responsible for a copayment or yearly deductible. Members can use both PPO and
non-PPO doctors and hospitals, but economic incentives are used to sway the mem-
ber toward the PPO providers.
34. For the purposes of this Article, "member" will be used interchangeably with
.subscriber" and "enrollee." All three terms are used by HMOs to denote an individu-
al covered by the HMO.
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manner in which the service is rendered. The ability to attract consum-
ers with low monthly premiums while managing to keep health care
expenditures down has proven to be very lucrative, allowing most
HMOs to go public and become for-profit organizations." Health Net,
California's second-largest HMO behind Kaiser Permanente, posted 1996
revenues totalling $108 million. 6
Before managed care, in the age of FFS indemnity insurance, the
average doctor-patient relationship looked something like the following.
A woman, let's call her Wendy, could walk into her doctor's office con-
fident that her doctor would provide her with the best medical care
available. Wendy's only concern was that her doctor might overtreat
her, becahse she knew that her doctor could make more money with
more treatment. She knew how her doctor was compensated because
she paid the doctor directly, as she was personally responsible for at
least twenty percent of the total bill." Wendy's relationship with her
doctor was completely transparent because she knew about any con-
flict of interest that might be present. If she felt the doctor overtreated
her, or if she was unhappy, she could simply pay the bill and choose
another doctor. This rarely came to pass because Wendy had been go-
ing to her doctor for many years and had developed a friendly and
meaningful relationship.
Unfortunately, this relationship between Wendy and her doctor is
difficult, if not impossible, to find today. As medical costs spiraled con-
tinuously upward in the 1980s, critics began clamoring that something
needed to change. 8 The "solution" that Wall Street and business exec-
35. Of California's largest HMOs, only its largest, Kaiser Permanente, has remained
a non-profit organization. The importance of the classification is evidenced by the
fact that for-profit HMOs generally apply less than 75% of the premiums received by
subscribers to medical care expenditures, while non-profit HMOs generally use 98% of
premiums toward actual medical care. See generally Froma Harrop, Health Care Con-
spiracy Ought to Make You Sick, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 22, 1996, at B7, available in
1996 WL 3279893 (discussing financial incentives for HMOs to reduce care for sick
patients).
36. See Jamie Clary, Top 100 List Unique and Comprehensive Undertaking, NASH-
VLLE Bus. J., June 16, 1997, at 33, available in 1997 WL 9081245.
37. The most common indemnity insurance arrangement under FFS was an 80-20
plan, where the insurance company paid 80% of the bill and the patient was responsi-
ble for the remaining 20%.
38. During the 1980s, health care costs in the United States tripled, and by the
year 2000 are expected to reach $1.7 trillion, about 18% of the Gross National Prod-
uct. See Leonard A. Hagen, Comment, Physician Credentialing: Economic Criteria
utives sold to Congress and health care leaders was the HMO system,
which attempts to treat the delivery of medical care and treatment as a
business. Health care continues to be taken over by huge, publicly-trad-
ed corporations that have instituted the same type of business and
accounting practices that are used in other industries. After all, if other
forms of business, like the automotive and electronic industries, have
succeeded by rationing, streamlining, and cost-cutting, why not health
care? The answer to that question is simple. It cannot work because the
health care industry is unlike any other business. Health care deals with
real people with real lives, not pork bellies or microchips.
In what other industry does the consumer become a "financial liabili-
ty rather than... a financial opportunity" as soon as the consumer
wants to use the product?' Most companies make money when their
customers use services, but that is not the case in managed care. When
patients get sick and utilize care, HMOs lose money, and that causes
doctors to lose money. In fact, once the patient needs health care, espe-
cially if that care is continuing or otherwise expensive, the HMO is
financially better off if the patient dies, because its costs basically cease
where family funeral expenses begin.
In what other industry, besides, of course, the funeral industry, is a
company better off once the consumer dies? In what other industry
does the corporation refuse to stand behind its product and accept
accountability, instead hiding behind a poorly interpreted federal loop-
hole4" that denies patients and their families any remedy4 1 What
would it be like to lose your spouse in an automobile accident caused
by a faulty gas tank and discover that the court can only order the
automobile manufacturer to make restitution by replacing the cost of
the faulty gas tank? That is exactly the case with managed health care
Compete with the Hippocratic Oath, 31 GoNZ. L. REV. 427, 428-29 (1996).
39. DENNIS ROBBINS, INTEGRATING MANAGED CARE AND ETHics 35 (McGraw-Hill
1998).
40. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994). ERISA covers the majority of HMO patients and effectively pro-
hibits a patient from recovering in court the damages caused by improper denial or
withholding of care by the HMO. See id. Those covered by ERISA can only recover
the amount of the treatment or procedure that was denied. See id. A few of the very
narrow exceptions to ERISA are public employees, school teachers, church workers,
and those who pay their HMO directly. See id.
41. When consumers are denied a remedy to seek redress for negligent, or even
intentional, conduct, studies have shown significant increases in the severity of such
conduct. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort
Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994)(discussing, inter
alia, the increase in automobile fatalities and accidents in jurisdictions employing no-
fault systems).
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today. Human life has been devalued to the point that it has no value in
the current system.
As is becoming painfully, and in some cases deadly, obvious, health
care is unlike any other business and is not fit for many business prac-
tices because it deals with people-not products-and real lives and
families are at stake.42 Profits must occasionally take a back seat. The
transparent, moral doctor-patient relationship is essential to the health
care delivery system, and, as such, it is at a crossroads. In order for the
doctor-patient relationship to survive, the same standards that apply to
doctors need to be applied to the HMOs that try to control the doctor-
patient relationship by challenging doctor decisions and denying care.
The influx of HMOs into the health care system has placed three
enormous pressures on its central and essential delivery point, the doc-
tor-patient relationship: (1) financial incentives not to treat patients, (2)
restrictions on doctor disclosures, and (3) the use of further cost con-
tainment methods such as gatekeeping and utilization review. Such
pressures amount to economic experimentation on humans by HMOs.
Even worse, the HMOs will not disclose this fact, and there is no con-
sent because the patients have no idea that they are economic laborato-
ry animals for the different studies done by HMOs to determine the
best way to cut health care costs. This Article discusses each of these
pressures in turn.
A. Undisclosed Financial Incentives that Deter Care
The predominant method by which HMOs have attempted to cut
health care costs while still making a profit for their stockholders has
been by changing how doctors are paid.' Generally, these can be
placed into two categories: basic payment methods and incentives that
add to or detract from the basic payment methods.'
42. See Managed Health Care Improvement Task Force, Draft Executive Summary
(Jan. 5, 1998) (on file with author). A recent study conducted by Governor Wilson's
Task Force on Managed Care found that 42% of the insured population had experi-
enced at least one major problem with their HMO, 22% of which reported that the
problem led to a deterioration in their health, and 6% of which stated that the prob-
lem resulted in permanent disability. See id.
43. See generally Marsha S. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements
Managed-Care Plans Make with Physicians, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1678 (1995) (re-
porting on a study of the managed care payment arrangements in twenty metropoli-
tan areas nationwide).
44. See generally Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Pay-
Medical groups aid their doctors are generally paid in one of three
ways: FFS, salary, or capitation. Traditional FFS has been largely elimi-
nated and replaced by discounted FFS, such as the type found in PPOs.
Salary methods are used only in Staff model HMOs. Capitation, howev-
er, has exploded with the rise of managed care.
In a capitated contract, the medical group and/or the doctor is paid a
set payment per member per month by the HMO. Often the doctor
receives the same amount of money for each member each month,
regardless of whether the patient is healthy or ill or whether the doctor
sees the patient or not. Consequently, the emphasis has been shifted to
the quantity of patients enrolled with the doctor, because the more
capitated patients for which a doctor provides, the more monthly pay-
ments the doctor receives. This has forced doctors to become insurers
themselves as the risk of patients getting sick has been shifted from the
HMO to the doctor, who hopes that all of his or her patients do not get
sick at the same time.
Doctors, for the most part, have been forced to accept these con-
tracts in order to stay in business. To be a doctor, one needs patients,
and HMOs, not doctors, now control a large portion of the patients.45
The amount of capitated payments can range dramatically. In practice,
we have personally seen capitated rates as high as thirty-five dollars per
member per month and as low as five dollars per member per month.
The capitated amount is intended to cover the cost of the patient's
medical treatment for the month, often including testing, referrals to
specialists, or even necessary hospitalizations.
Capitation alone creates an undisclosed financial incentive for the
doctor not to see the patient, resulting in an impermissible conflict of
interest between the patient's health and the doctor's financial inter-
ests.4" After all, the doctor does not get paid to actually see the pa-
ments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399, 400-11 (1996) (discussing the different
types of incentive payments made to physicians by HMOs and the potential conflicts
of interest that arise).
45. See Michelle M. Kwon, Comment, Move Over Marcus Welby, M.D. and Make
Way for Managed Care: The Implications cf Capitation, Gag Clauses, and Economic
Credentialing, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 829, 835 (1997). Some estimates place the total
managed care population at close to 140 million people. See id.
46. There are those who will argue that this is irrelevant because doctors have a
conflict of interest under FFS as well-the conflict between the-patient's health and
the doctor's maxinization of profits by overtreating. This is an oversimplified argu-
ment at best. At least under FFS doctors and patients had the same goal, which was
to heal the patient as quickly as possible. Patients had that goal for obvious reasons,
while doctors wanted to heal patients quickly for more ulterior reasons-to be able
to treat the next patient and to give the patient an incentive to return. In contrast,
managed care pits the patient's goals directly against those of the doctor. See Ronald
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tient, because the doctor gets paid the same regardless of whether the
patient comes in. Worse for the doctor, and thus for the patient, if the
patient does come in and needs medical care that exceeds the capitated
amount, it comes directly out of the doctor's pocket. The large, public-
ly-traded HMOs, the entities most capable of absorbing these medical
costs, have secretly altered the risk apportionment and shifted it all to
the doctors, leaving the patient out of the picture. This can have no
other effect than to disconnect the doctor-patient relationship.
There are two basic financial incentive schemes that modify the basic
payment methods: risk pools and withholds. Risk pools are large sums
of money consisting of patient premiums withheld from capitated pay-
ments. The distribution of this money, to which doctors should already
be entitled, is normally tied to complex formulas taking into account
money saved by reducing referrals, hospital usage, testing, and employ-
ment of specialists.
Withholds are either percentages or set dollar amounts that an HMO
deducted from the doctor's or group's capitated payments and set aside
to ensure that the physician is paying her billsY These set-asides are
supposed to be used as funds for outside referrals or by the HMO as a
type of bonus scheme, whereby the HMO sets a target number for
health care expenditures. The HMO can and will simply keep the with-
hold for "expenses" if the doctor or group exceeds the target or if the
HMO deems such retention necessary. Doctors are obviously losers in
this equation, but they will not be as adversely affected as the
chronically ill and those patients who are sick and in need of care.
The practical effects of withholds and risk pools are the same as
those associated with capitation. They create an undisclosed, inherent
conflict of interest,' which functions as a very real incentive to HMOs
to force doctors to undertreat patients, especially if a doctor is in dan-
Bronow, HMO Physicians' Shared Risk Pools Are Dangerous to Patients' Health, 10
No. 1 HEALTHSPAN 9, 10-11 (1993). After all, "[wiould you rather have one extra test
to confirm the cause of your chest pain or one less test so the corporation may
show a higher profit?" Id. at 11.
47. Note the practical effect of the withhold. If a doctor is "capped" (i.e., signs a
capitated contract) for five dollars per month, he or she could receive even less if
there are any withholds involved, which is more than likely. Thus, a mere one or
two dollars may be what the doctor has allocated for all your health care for the
month. What kind of medical care do you think one dollar per month buys?
48. Cf. supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text (discussing patients' expectations
in terms of the doctor-patient relationship).
ger of going over the amount remaining in the risk pool, in which case
the doctor would be individually responsible. These incentives have
shifted the financial risk of costly medical care to doctors and away
from the HMOs. HMOs do not add any value to the health care
equation, because as "insurers" they no longer assume any of the finan-
cial risk of costly or prolonged medical care.
B. Restrictions on Doctor Disclosures
The financial incentives just described, and others like them, create a
conflict of interest for the physician and seriously damage the trust that
must be inherent in the doctor-patient relationship. HMOs have aggra-
vated the situation and have further torn at the moral covenant be-
tween doctors and patients by forbidding doctors from disclosing their
financial arrangements to their patients.
A standard part of the HMO-physician contract are provisions that
forbid doctors from revealing their financial arrangements or criticizing
the HMO. These clauses attempt to restrict what the physician can
communicate to his or her patient during the course of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship. Such clauses can be classified as restricting three
major categories of speech by the physician: (1) disclosing to the pa-
tient how the physician is paid, (2) telling the patient about all treat-
ment options and what other health payors may cover, and (3) engaging
in public health care debate.49 Although recent federal and state legis-
lation prohibits HMOs from restricting doctors from discussing treat-
ment alternatives with patients, HMOs still expressly or impliedly,
through economic credentialing' and not-for-cause terminations, en-
join all other types of communication between doctor and patient. The
fundamental effect of any restriction on disclosure is to place added
strain on the doctor-patient relationship.
49. See Julia A. Martin & Lisa K Bjerknes, The Legal and Ethical Implications of
Gag Clauses in Physician Contracts, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 433, 443 (1996) (providing a
comprehensive look at gag clauses); Jennifer L. D'Isidori, Note, Stop Gagging Physi-
cians!, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 187 (1997) (discussing the legal ramifications of gag provi-
sions on the doctor-patient relationship); Nancy J. Picinic, Note, Physicians, Bound
and Gagged: Federal Attempts to Combat Managed Care's Use of Gag Clauses, 21
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 567 (1997) (discussing federal attempts to prevent use of gag
clauses in physician-MCO contracts); see also Diane S. Swanson, Comment, Physician
Gag Clauses-The Hypocrisy of the Hippocratic Oath, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 313 (1997)
(discussing the conflicts of interest arising from physician gag orders mandated by
HMOs).
50. Economic credentialing is essentially the process of employing and terminating
doctors based on their ability to keep hospitalizations and other medical costs down.
See Hagen, supra note 38, at 441-43.
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One of the key aspects of an "ideal" doctor-patient relationship is
open and honest communication." Implied or implicit communication
restrictions eliminate any remnant of trust between doctor and patient
because they restrict the physician's ability to fully communicate any
apparent conflict of interest or the availability of options, some of
which might be life-saving, to the patient. This is especially true for
physicians who are already under the pressure of having to choose
between their patients and their families under the capitation/withhold
payment scheme. Furthermore, barriers to the free flow of information
can eliminate trust between doctors and patients even if the patients
are not covered by the HMO. The patient will hear about the payment
methods and information restrictions from some source and will never
be able to trust his or her doctor again. Any time a doctor tells a pa-
tient that he or she does not need to see a specialist or does not need
an expensive MRI (magnetic resonance image), the patient will not
know whether that is the doctor's honest opinion, or if the doctor is
unable to give an honest opinion because of a contractual communica-
tion restrictions.
C. Gatekeeping and Utilization Review
In addition to the aforementioned financial incentives and gag claus-
es, HMOs use other cost-containment methods to further reduce medi-
cal expenditures and increase shareholder profits. Two of the most
common methods are gatekeeping and utilization review.
Gatekeeping is a term used to denote the HMO practice of using
primary care physicians as "gatekeepers" of the rest of the HMO's re-
sources. When subscribers enroll with an HMO, they must choose a
primary care physician, through whom subscribers must go to receive
medical care. The primary care physician acts as rationer of health care
resources, deciding who receives referrals to specialists or further test-
ing and who does not. The obvious problem with this is that the gate-
keeper physician, who controls access to all medical care for his or her
patients, is most likely capitated and bound by a gag clause in his or
her contract. 2 Thus, even if the patient accurately suspects that her
51. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 21, at 324.
52. See Susan L Goldberg, A Cure for What Ails? Why the Medical Advocate Is
Not the Answer to Problems in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 1 WIDENER L. SYMP.
J. 325, 337-72 (1996) (discussing the various problems with gatekeeping).
HMO has tampered .with the doctor-patient relationship and forced her
doctor into an irreconcilable conflict of interest, the patient cannot
discuss this with her doctor and cannot go anywhere else to receive
covered medical care.'
Another, less obvious, problem with this approach is that it often
forces primary care physicians, the vast majority of whom are general
or family practitioners, into medical roles for which most are unfit or
not competent to handle.' As gatekeepers, the primary care physicians
are often asked or economically forced to examine conditions or per-
form procedures that are beyond their areas of expertise. For example,
in a recent study involving the twenty most commonly encountered
skin conditions, only fifty-four percent of primary care physicians were
able to make the correct diagnosis, while over ninety percent of derma-
tology residents and students made the correct diagnosis.'
The flip side of gatekeeping is utilization review. "Utilization re-
view... is the process by which [the HMO] determines if medical ser-
vices are appropriate and necessary. "' Additionally, the process delays
any immediate action that the doctor has recommended for the patient.
Thus, even if the doctor resolves the conflict of interest and determines
that the patient needs to see a specialist, the HMO may still overturn
the doctor's decision and either significantly delay the action or deny
the referral altogether. 7 This lack of trust on the part of the HMO with
respect to the doctor's decisions, in light of the measures already taken
by the HMO to ensure the doctor's awareness of cost-containment,
weakens and frustrates the doctor's faith in the system and the patient's
faith in the doctor and the system.
53. See generally Edmund D. Pellegrino, Ethics, 271 JAMA 1668, 1669 (1994) (dis-
cussing the ethical questions surrounding the gatekeeper physician system).
54. This directly conflicts with the competence requirement of the "ideal" doctor-
patient relationship. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 21 and accompanying text, at
324.
55. See Bronow, supra note 46, at 11. By forcing doctors into roles for which they
are unfit, HMOs can actually increase costs, such as additional visits due to misdiag-
nosis, subsequent referrals, additional testing, wrongly prescribed medications, and the
likelihood of more expensive treatment that may have been unnecessary had there
been a correct diagnosis made earlier by a qualified specialist in the field. See id.
56. See Vernellia R. Randall, Managed Care, Utilization Review, and Financial
Risk Shifting: Compensating Patients for Health Care Cost Containment Injuries, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 27, 41-65 (1993) (summarizing the various avenues of
liability that patients have available to them, as well as the barriers standing in their
way).
57. The irony associated with utilization review is that in many HMOs, nurses or
even non-medical personnel are supposed to second-guess a doctor's determination of
medical necessity.
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In light of the ideal doctor-patient relationship as discussed in Part
I,' it is abundantly clear that managed care and its incentives, restric-
tions, and cost-cutting methods have wreaked havoc on the doctor-
patient relationship. In today's managed health care climate, it is practi-
cally impossible for four of the six Cs of the doctor-patient relationship
to exist: there is virtually no choice, less competence, no communica-
tion, and an ever-present, inherent conflict of interest. Sadly, the pros-
pects for the remaining two Cs, compassion and continuity, appear
bleak indeed. As a result, we are facing a break-up of the doctor-patient
relationship.
HI. FROM BREAK-UP TO MAKE-UP: THE KEY TO RESTORING THE
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
The key to healing the rift in the doctor-patient relationship can be
reduced to one simple concept: accountability and disclosure. If we are
to restore the doctor-patient relationship to its former status as one of
the most revered institutions in history, accountability should be im-
posed on all parties involved: accountability to themselves, to each
other, and to society at large. Without accountability, there can be nei-
ther responsibility nor change.59 The following are our proposals for
accountability.
A. Patient Accountability
The American consumer has been seduced by a bombardment of
HMO advertising into believing that we should not have to pay for quali-
ty health care. We have been led to believe that if we hold jobs where
our employers provide for health care or merely pay the low, low price
of a few dollars per month, then we should have access to the best
health care available. In so doing, we have forgotten the old maxim:
Nothing good in life comes for free. To truly reform the system, the
patient needs to be reentered into the payment system. When the pa-
tient is an integral part of the payment system, the patient has control
58. See supra notes 10-29 and accompanying text.
59. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 13-14
(1994). After comparing no-fault tort regimes with traditional liability schemes, the au-
thors conclude it "is hardly startling . .. [that] individuals are more likely to be care-
less in a world in which people are not liable when they act carelessly." See id. at
14.
over both the treatment received, and the provider thereof, in addition
to having the ability to weed out incompetent or unsatisfactory doctors
through normal market forces.
Moreover, the patient would be forced to become more involved in
the health care system and would ask questions before becoming ill. In
turn, this would force HMO benefit booklets and evidences of coverage
to be more clear in delineating that which they will and will not cover.
In addition to the aforementioned differences from other businesses,
health care is unique in that while everyone needs health insurance,
evidenced by the fact that everyone who can afford it buys it, ninety
percent of the population never really needs it because ninety percent
of the population is generally in good health. Consequently, because we
buy health care thinking that we will never really need it, we do not do
sufficient research prior to the purchase thereof. We are sure that the
average American spends a great deal more thought on a car purchase
or even that of a personal computer than is spent on health insurance,
even though the potential consequences of a misinformed choice of
health insurance are infinitely more devastating. Most of us are un-
aware of the coverage limitations of our individual policies until it is
too late to do anything about it. The consumer must become more
involved in, and more knowledgeable about, the health care system.
This involves demanding disclosure from HMOs about how their doc-
tors, laboratories, and hospitals are paid and what portion of premiums
paid are actually applied to medical care.
B. Doctor Accountability
Doctors should think twice before they accept conflicting capitated
contracts from HMOs. They should be free to compete personally for
patients, while at the same time not allowing HMOs to "own" patients
and control where they receive their medical care. If it were the case
that doctors were free to compete personally for patients, patients
would be free to shop around for their medical care and would become
more involved in the system.
Employers could be completely removed from the equation, and the
tax breaks currently given to employers for their employees' health care
could be passed on to the individual. Market forces would then drive
prices down to a level where botL sides could function. The result
would be real people, real prices, and, more importantly, a return to the
transparent relationship between doctor and patient.
In the absence of the above radical reform, doctors must at least
maintain a transparent relationship with their patients. Patients have an
absolute right to know how their health care dollar is used and how
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their doctor is paid. HMOs should disclose to patients how their doc-
tors are paid, any actual or potential conflicts of interest, and inform
their patients of all treatment alternatives, including those not covered
by their individual plans.
C. HMO Accountability
In order to allow patients and doctors to have a fully transparent
relationship, HMOs should be prohibited from including disclosure re-
strictions in their contracts with doctors and should not be allowed to
terminate doctors without good cause. If economic credentialing and
the threat of retaliatory termination were not held over doctors' heads,
the doctor's moral obligation, indeed his or her natural instinct, to
make the patient's health and interests the top priority could again
prevail.
In addition to being accountable to doctors, HMOs must be held
accountable to their patients. The only way to hold HMOs accountable
to the consumer is to allow patients access to the court system. Cur-
rently, HMOs are like tyrants hidden behind the walls of a fortress with
an artificial moat between them and the townspeople. The moat must
be removed, and the castle walls must be torn down.'.
The moat is ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974,6" which effectively shields HMOs from being held accountable to
any of their members who receive their health insurance through a pri-
vate employer.6" ERISA is a deadly statute of unintended consequenc-
es,' which allows HMOs to make money hand over fist while denying
60. See Jamie Court, Commentary, Close the HMOs' Favorite Loophole, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 1998, at B7 (stating that the only means by which patients can be protected
is to allow HMOs to be sued in court).
61. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA).
62. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. ERISA was enacted to protect the
pension benefits of employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994). Unfortunately, it has
been misconstrued to cover all employer-provided benefits, including health care. In
so doing, it has created a loophole that HMOs have been quick to exploit. More
specifically, ERISA requires that any action be brought in federal court, and limits
the remedy available to the consumer to the price of the treatment or procedure
denied. See id. § 1332(a)(1), (e)(1).
63. See Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 49-65 (D. Mass.
1997) (discussing the need to amend ERISA). In speaking of ERISA and its
powerlessness, the Andrews-Clarke district court stated the following: "Enacted to
safeguard the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ERISA has evolved into
more and more care. ERISA harms doctors by improperly making them
litigation targets when, in fact, the HMO is responsible for the decisions
giving rise to the cause of action. As a result, patients are injured be-
cause they cannot be made whole.
The few consumers who are not subject to ERISAM still have to get
past the castle walls to get to the tyrant. The walls in this metaphor
represent the binding arbitration clauses imposed by HMOs on their
members, which basically require that the members relinquish their
constitutional rights by signing on the dotted line.6" Such clauses are
inserted into the HMO policies, which are in all respects contracts of
adhesion. Once this happens, the only recourse patients have is the
internal grievance process of the HMO, which ultimately ends in a pri-
vate, costly' arbitration hearing with arbitrators selected at least par-
tially by the HMO.67 Taking our defective gas tank analogy at the be-
ginning of Part II one step further, this is like having the president of
the automobile manufacturer as the judge presiding over the bench
"trial." This judge then determines whether his own company needs to
be held accountable to the consumer. These costly arbitration proceed-
ings effectively chill the patient's ability to seek redress and irreparably
damages patients' trust in the system's ability to do justice.
By removing the artificial barriers that surround the HMOs and forc-
ing HMOs to be held accountable to their members and to society at
large, we can foster greater competition between those HMOs that do
not cheat and are honestly committed to providing their members with
quality care while trying to keep unnecessary costs down. After all,
a shield of immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review providers, and
other managed care entities from potential liability for the consequences of their
wrongful denial of health benefits." Id. at 53.
64. ERISA does not apply to public (state-level and below) employees, church
workers, and those who pay their HMO directly for health coverage. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(b) (1994).
65. Although this is more a subject for a separate paper, it is worth noting that
Thomas Jefferson considered the right to a jury trial among the most fundamental of
rights. See THOMAS JEFFERSON ON POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT (visited February 5, 1998)
<http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffl520.htm>.
66. Arbitration proceedings are significantly more expensive than going to court for
most patients because they have to pay both their attorneys and the arbitrator(s).
Further, patients are actually forced to double-pay, because their taxes go toward
funding the court system, to which they are denied access.
67. Until January 1998, Kaiser Permanente in effect used its own arbitrators to re-
solve disputes with members. See Ron Shinkman, Kaiser Sets New Grievance Process,
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Jan. 19, 1998, at 24. Most HMOs require a panel of three arbitra-
tors to be used with each party choosing their own arbitrator, who then in turn
agree on a third. For an example of how HMOs can use this system to the detriment
of consumers, see Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997).
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what does a company that is doing things the right way have to fear
from the consumer or the court system? The best deterrent to keep
companies from taking advantage of consumers is the potential club
carried by a wronged consumer with access to the court system.6
Critics will say that removing these barriers will simply result in over-
crowding the court system. That is simply not true. Since Fox v. Health
Net,' my sister's case where the jury found that the HMO acted with
fraud, oppression, and malice in denying a breast cancer treatment and
awarded a record $89 million verdict, our office has helped 140 other
families receive treatment that was originally wrongfully denied by their
HMO. In that time, we have only been forced to fie five lawsuits
against HMOs. Not only is that great tort reform, but it is even better
for the doctors and patients who are involved.7" Removing these barri-
ers would actually keep doctors and patients out of the courtroom, and
would put them back in the operating room where they belong.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our ultimate goal should be to put patients above profits, and to dust
off the collective moral conscience that is currently buried under stacks
of stock certificates and quarterly returns. All players in the health care
delivery system-patients, doctors, and industrypersons-need to par-
ticipate in accordance with the same standards and ethical precepts set
forth by Cardinal Bernardin.
The current system, which holds doctors to a different standard than
the number-crunchers who interfere with the doctors' judgment and
medical decisions on a regular basis, is grossly unfair. Not only do
HMOs question the judgment and experience of doctors, but they force
68. See BAIRD, supra note 59, at 14. Under the current laws, HMOs operate in
what is effectively a no-fault system. Thus, it should surprise no one that HMOs are
so callous with regard to the health of patients and the relationship between patients
and their doctors. See id. The District Court of Massachusetts agreed, stating that
"the practical impact of ERISA . . . is to immunize [the insurance company] from any
potential liability for the consequences of their denial of benefits." See Andrews-
Clarke, 984 F. Supp. at 55-56.
69. No. 219692, 1993 WL 794305 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 28, 1993).
70. See Joanne B. Stem, The HMO Experience (As Seen By A Health Care Law-
yer), 1 DEPAuL J. HEALTH CARE L. 395, 407 (1996) (proposing that "[1]arge damage
awards and the concomitant publicity just might embarrass the industry to reform
itself, as it has in many product liability cases").
doctors into incredibly difficult situations each time a patient becomes
ill. 7 1
Equally unfair is the license that has been given to HMOs by poorly-
written decisions and misconstrued statutes which enables HMOs to
make patients the victims of economic experimentation without their
consent or knowledge. Patients need to research and pay attention to
the health care they purchase, but how can they when the health care
industry is allowed to conceal the conflicts that it imposes on the deliv-
ery of health care-conflicts that may not just be unfair, but fatal. Cur-
rently, patients are not allowed access to the information that they need
to make proper, informed decisions, such as where their health care
dollar goes and how much their primary care physicians receive from
their premiums. 2 Without this crucial information, and without the
ability to hold HMOs accountable, consumers cannot wield their market
power to force HMOs out of business.73
If we are to restore the moral fiber to the doctor-patient relationship,
we need to tear down the industry-supplied barriers that are ripping at
its soul. If honesty and transparency are made priorities in the health
care delivery system, then the doctor-patient relationship can be recon-
ciled, and we can once again use the phrase "health care" as something
other than an oxymoron.
71. In order to prevent this, here are five steps that doctors should take before
contracting with an HMO: (1) read and understand the liability risks they may be
taking on by agreeing to an HMO contract; (2) make sure there are no conflicts of
interest that can pit them against their patients; (3) be leery of contract termination
clauses that allow terminations for something other than good cause, because these
clauses can be used against patient advocates; (4) know whether or not they are
being economically credentialed by the HMO or entities associated with the HMO;
and (5) make sure their contract does not require them to be a witness on behalf of
the HMO against their patients should a matter be litigated.
72. With this in mind, we recommend that patients ask these five questions before
joining an HMO: (1) what percentage of the monthly HMO premium actually goes to
medical care providers (doctors, hospitals, laboratories, etc.)?; (2) how much money
is actually received by your primary care physician from your premium for your
care?; (3) does the HMO's contract with your doctor allow it to terminate the con-
tract if your doctor overtilizes services?; (4) do the HMO doctors receive bonuses at
the end of the year from the HMO if they limit referrals to specialists or hospitals?;
and (5) what are the most frequently requested procedures that the HMO routinely
denies on the basis that they are "experimental/investigational" or "not medically nec-
essary"?
73. See Stern, supra note 70, at 407.
